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14 
INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF 
INVESTORS: PROBLEMS, QUICK FIXES AND LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS 
 
Eva Micheler 
I. Introduction 
 
The infrastructure underpinning financial markets is important. It affects us individually as pension 
investors. It is also important from a macro-economic perspective. Financial markets and their 
infrastructure underpin capitalism – the fundamental idea which our society is built on. In this 
system investors provide finance to issuers. Financial markets support this by providing an exit 
route for investors. They supply issuers with open-ended equity finance, termed debt finance or 
something in between and, at the same time, enable investors to flexibly determine their own time 
horizon.   
The financial markets infrastructure also supplies plumbing. Payment systems transfer money.  
Custodians 'look after' assets. They keep records of who owns what. They organise securities 
lending and that opens up an additional source of income for investors.  It also enables borrowers of 
securities to obtain finance.   
In addition the infrastructure supports the provision of pensions. With good reasons governments 
have retreated from providing state pensions and are instead encouraging the private provision of 
pensions. They, however, continue to fund this by granting workers tax breaks that make it 
attractive for them to invest their pension savings in financial assets.   
All of this is good and worth having. This paper is written firmly on the basis that capitalism and 
securities markets are beneficial. The criticism is that the current infrastructure does not serve the 
interests of investors.   
Infrastructure related cost is a longstanding problem troubling securities markets. The cost of 
settlement was lamented in the Lamfalussy report in 2001.
1
 This triggered the Giovannini process 
and informed the work of the Legal Certainty Group.
2
 Most recently Benos, Garratt and Gurrola-
Perez analyse the economics of distributed ledger technology and also refer to the cost associated 
with securities settlement. There are estimates that the revenue from settlement, custody and 
collateral management amounts to 13 % of the total trade value chains (from execution to 
                                               
1
 Alexandre Lamfalussy, Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets 
(Brussels 15 February 2001) <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-
wise-men_en.pdf> accessed 26 June 2018. 
2
 Legal Certainty Group, EU Clearing and Settlement Advice (Brussels 11 August 2006) and Legal Certainty Group, 
Solutions to Barriers Related to Post Trading with the EU (Brussels August 2008) both reports are available from 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/advice-legal-certainty-group-2006-2008_en> accessed 26 June 2018. 
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settlement).
3
 That is a high price for the processing of transactions. In addition to the cost associated 
with the process spanning from execution to settlement there is the cost associated with holding 
securities. Benos, Garratt and Gurrola-Perez mention the cost of reconciliations and other 
compliance processes that need to be carried out by in custody chains.
4
 These are reflected in the 
fees that investors pay for the holding of assets. Adding to this visible service charge, custody 
chains have an effect on assets and their value.
5
    
In the remaining parts of this chapter, first the characteristics of this infrastructure are briefly 
described (part II). Then four recent examples where these characteristics have affected the value of 
assets are analysed (part III). Part IV explains the perspective of the providers of the current 
infrastructure. In part V the perspective of investors is analysed. The problems analysed in this 
paper only arise because investors permit custodians to outsource custody and accept that they bear 
the risk associated with sub-custodians. At an international level custody chains do not need to be as 
long as they currently are. It will be shown that there are good reasons to assume that there is a 
market failure and that behavioural patterns can explain that investors do not appreciate the 
implications of the current framework and are also not able to put in place a more cost effective 
contractual framework that better suits their financial interests. There are quick fix alternatives (part 
VI). Investors with bargaining power can insist on better custody terms or on holding UK securities 
directly. International investors can also avoid English law. It will be argued in part VII that the 
availability of distributed ledger/blockchain technology is unlikely to remedy the problems 
associated with custody chains. The chapter will point towards longer term solutions available to 
the government (part VIII). It concludes by tentatively observing that we may have reached a point 
where property rights in securities no longer exist, where client asset rules are no longer sufficient 
to ensure financial stability and where custody should be treated in the same way the taking of 
deposits (part IX). 
II. Characteristics of the current infrastructure 
At a positive level the current infrastructure is characterised by complexity. This has been explained 
in more detail elsewhere.
6
 For the purposes of this chapter a summary of the points made there will 
be helpful.   
The current infrastructure for transferring and holding securities operates on the basis of custody 
chains. There are frequently several custodians inserted between issuers and investors. Only one of 
these has an immediate connection with the investor/ultimate account holder. From the perspective 
of investors custody chains set out in the introduction of this book
7
 look like this:  
 
 
                                               
3
 Evangelos Benos, Rod Garratt and Pedro Gurrola-Perez, 'The economics of distributed ledger technologies for 
securities settlement’, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No 670 (August 2017) 4 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023779> accessed 26 June 2018. 
4
 ibid, 4. 
5
 Eva Micheler, ‘Custody Chains and Asset Values’ (2015) Cambridge Law Journal 505, also available on  
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/62609/. 
6
 ibid. 
7
 See the Introduction to this volume, ch 1.II. 
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The effect of this structure is thatultimate account holders, while enjoying some benefits,
8
 are 
exposed to a number of risks. By having accepted this form of holding the terms offered by the 
issuer are reduced by the terms that operate between the custodians that form part of the chain. 
Ultimate account holders do not receive the benefit of the full terms associated with the instrument 
they have bought.   
In chapter six of this volume case law was  examined in which a custody chain made it impossible 
for investors to sue an issuer for reasons of mis-selling.
9
 Custody chains can also prevent ultimate 
account holders from exercising voting rights including rights to object to the company being 
delisted. For example, in Eckerle v Wickeder,
10
 the claimants held shares in a UK registered public 
limited company through a chain of intermediaries. The shares were listed on the German stock 
exchange. The company delisted from that exchange and resolved to transform itself from a public 
to a private company. The claimants objected to both the delisting and the transformation on the 
basis that these reduced the value of their investment. Because their shares were issued by a UK 
registered company, but only listed on a German exchange, they were unable to rely on UK 
takeover regulation. Under section 98 of the Companies Act 2006 holders of not less than 5% of the 
shares of a company may apply to court to either have the shareholder resolution authorising the 
transformation cancelled or to receive an order making an arrangement for the purchase of the 
interest of the dissentient members. The claimants held 7.2% of the company’s share capital and so 
thought that they would be entitled to a remedy under section 98. Their claim failed because their 
names were not entered on the shareholder register. Norris J concluded that they held the ‘ultimate 
economic interest in underlying securities’, but that was not sufficient to entitle them to exercise 
                                               
8
 See Christopher Twemlow’s chapter in this volume ‘Why are securities held in intermediated form?’ 
9
 Secure Capital SA v Credit Suisse AG [2017] EWCA Civ 1486; [2017] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 599, discussed in Ray Cox’s 
chapter in this volume [add title] and Richard Salter’s chapter in this volume, ‘Enforcing debt securities’. 
10
 Eckerle v Wickeder [2013] EWHC 68 (Ch), [2014] Ch 196. 
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rights under the Companies Act 2006.
11
 He was conscious that his reading of the Act deprived 
indirect investors (that is, those who held securities through the intermediated system) of the sort of 
protection which those who formulated the Act would have extended to minority shareholders and 
was not ‘particularly comfortable’ with the solution he had to arrive at, but felt that the any other 
conclusion would have amounted to an ‘impermissible form of judicial legislation’.12 The indirect 
holding system thus deprived the ultimate account holders of a remedy that would be available to an 
investor holding shares directly.  
The rights of ultimate account holders are affected by charges that are contained in contracts 
between custodians.
13
  If a sub-custodian grants a security interest to another sub-custodian over all 
securities held by him, that interest, if not limited, affects all the securities held by the first sub-
custodian. Such a security interest may thus affect securities held for ultimate account holders. This 
is not a hypothetical problem. In a recent Final Notice the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) fined 
Barclays Bank because investor securities had been at risk of being affected by such charges arising 
out of contracts that Barclays had entered into with sub-custodians.    It was held that Barclays had 
not give proper consideration as to whether to restrict the right of the third-party sub-custodians to 
exercise rights of ‘lien’, that is, the right ot create a security interest in the relevant assets.14  
Ultimate account holders are also affected by securities financing transactions that are organised by 
sub-custodians.
15
 These are contracts whereby the holder of securities transfers them to a third 
party. The third party undertakes to return securities of the same kind at a later point in time. 
Examples of such transactions are securities lending or repurchase agreements. They transform a 
legal or equitable interest into a contractual right.
16
 That contractual right is sometimes secured by 
collateral.
17
 Securities financial transactions can be a source of income for an ultimate account 
holder.
18
 Custodians help to arrange such transactions. In a custody chain it is possible that an 
ultimate account holder has not authorised the use of his assets for financing purposes, but that at 
the level of a sub-custodian such a use is permitted. Regulatory prohibitions notwithstanding 
investor securities can become affected by securities financial transactions that occur without the 
ultimate account holder’s consent or knowledge at the level of sub-custodians. Ultimate account 
                                               
11
 ibid, [14g] and [20]-[23]. 
12
 ibid, [31]. 
13
 Micheler (n 5) at 519-521. 
14
  FCA Final Notice, Barclays Bank PLC (122702) 23 September 2014.    This conduct resulted in a breach of Principle 
3 and CASS 6.2.2R, which states ‘A firm must introduce adequate organisational arrangements to minimise the risk of 
the loss or diminution of clients' safe custody assets, or the rights in connection with those safe custody assets, as a 
result of the misuse of the safe custody assets, fraud, poor administration, inadequate record-keeping or negligence.’  In 
addition, CASS 6.3.3G (which is a matter of guidance) states ‘A firm should consider carefully the terms of its 
agreements with third parties with which it will deposit safe custody assets belonging to a client. The following terms 
are examples of the issues firms should address in this agreement… (4) the restrictions over the third party's right to 
claim a lien, right of retention or sale over any safe custody asset standing to the credit of the account’. 
15
 Xx this paragraph to JB/LG. 
16
 Joanna Benjamin, Financial Law (OUP, 2008) ch 13: Philip Paech, Shadow Banking: Legal Issues of Collateral 
Assets and Insolvency Law (European Parliament IP/A/ECON/NT/2012, 30 June 2013) 33-35. 
17
 Hugh Beale, Michael Bridge, Louise Gullifer and Eva Lomnika, The Law of Security and Title Based Financing 3
rd
 
edn (OUP, 2018) [2.34], [7.65] and [7.73]. 
18
 Xx this paragraph to JB/LG. 
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holders can become exposed to risks of which they are not aware without being able to evaluate if 
the income generated by the third party arrangement is reflected in their own terms.
19
  
The interests of ultimate account holders are diluted by shortfalls that may occur at the level of sub-
custodians. Under English law ultimate account holderswho hold securities through custodians have 
an equitable interest in the securities held by their custodian. That interest is, however, only of value 
if the custodian holds sufficient assets in a way that earmarks them for the benefit of the ultimate 
account holder. In a custody chain an ultimate account holder only has a full entititlement if all 
custodians in the chain hold a sufficient amount of earmarked securities. A shortfall at any level 
will reduce the proprietary rights of the ultimate account holders.
20
  
The accountability for negligent services is underminded by a custody chain. If securities disappear 
as a result of the negligence or fraud of a custodian who has a direct contractual relationship with 
the ultimate account holder that custodian will be liable to the ultimate account holder. By agreeing 
to the outsourcing of custody the ultimate account holder bears the risk of the sub-custodian’s 
negligence or fraud, but does not necessarily receive a contractual right to claim against them. The 
ultimate account holders’ immediate custodian is very likely to have limited his liability to 
providing adequate oversight over the next sub-custodian.
21
 Examples of terms limiting liability for 
sub-custody can be found in the standard terms of Euroclear and Clearstream Banking Luxembourg 
(CBL). Euroclear is 'not liable for the acts or omissions of…any…subcustodian'.22 CBL also 
excludes liability for the 'acts or omissions of…any of CBL's…Sub-custodians'.23 
The risk emanating from the intermediated holding structure falls on ultimate account holders who 
are deemed to have accepted this risk. They give permission to their custodians to delegate 
custody.
24
 They also allow their custodians to instruct sub-custodians ‘upon such terms as may be 
customary’ and to 'from time to time, determine the terms and conditions of arrangement’ with sub-
custodian.
 25
 
III. Implications of current outsourcing arrangements for asset values 
The effect of ultimate account holders giving extensive permission for outsourcing to their 
custodians is a reduction of the rights of these ultimate account holders. Their rights are reduced in 
                                               
19
 Micheler (n 5) at 521-523. 
20
 ibid, 523-525. 
21
 ibid, 525-528. The CASS rules on shortfalls specify that a firm does not need to make good a shortfall when it 
concludes that another person is responsible (FCA Handbook, CASS 6.6.54(3) R). The firm must take all reasonable 
steps to resolve the situation without undue delay with the other person.  It must also consider whether it would be 
appropriate to notify the affected clients (CASS 6.6.54(3)). 
22
 Euroclear Terms and Conditions governing the use of Euroclear 
(https://my.euroclear.com/dam/EB/Legal%20information/Terms%20and%20conditions/public/LG310-terms-and-
conditions-governing-use-of-euroclear.pdf), Art 12(e); see also Art 17(e): For securities that are mutilated, lost, stolen 
or destroyed Euroclear has no obligation to but can "elect" to obtain reissuance.  If instructed by a participant they will 
obtain reissuance, but only "to the extent practicable"; see also Clearstream Banking Luxembourg, General Terms and 
Conditions, Art 48 <http://www.clearstream.com/blob/11088/aa624aadbd37147f75e57591378cf9f6/migrated-
8ffbcl196nsgden-terms-and-conditions-cbl-en-pdf-data.pdf> accessed 27 June 2018.   It is understood that the terms of 
custodians who hold for ultimate account holders include similar terms. 
23
 Clearstream Banking Luxembourg, General Terms and Conditions, ibid, Art 48, sentence 5. 
24
 Micheler (n 5) at 509-511. 
25
 ibid, 509-511. 
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a way that has an effect on the value of assets. They are saddled with custody risk which 
accumulates as the chain grows longer. Both points have been set out fully elsewhere.
26
 In this part 
two examples where custody chains have affected the value of securities portfolios are examined. In 
addition,two UK-based cases are discussed in which the regulator intervened to prevent a possible 
loss of client securities.    
When Bear Stearns was restructured in 2008 an excess of 28% of shares compared to the shares 
issued by the company was discovered. In the discussion paper justifying the Regulation of Central 
Securities Depositories the European Commission wrote: ‘Fortunately, Bear Stearns was rescued 
through a takeover by JP Morgan which bailed out the excess of securities.’27 In reality this meant, 
of course, that the price JP Morgan was prepared to pay was distributed between all indirect 
investors, diluting each of their holdings.  
Along similar lines shares issued by Dole Foods were affected by the intermediated holding 
infrastructure. Following a class action shareholders came forward claiming in relation 49,164,415 
shares. The company had issued only 36,793,758 shares.
28
 The excess of shares compared to shares 
issued in this instance was therefore 33.6%.   
In both of these cases we can observe that the excess arose on a self-reported basis. This amplifies 
the importance of the result. The issuers made a public announcement and invited investors to come 
forward and identify themselves. Assuming that not all investors can be reached by/will respond to 
such an announcement, one would expect the result to be that not all issued shares are claimed by 
investors. Instead a shortfall of securities revealed itself.   
Shortfalls are not a phenomenon limited to the US market. The FCA fined Bank of NY Mellon and 
Barclays Bank in 2015 because they did not keep accounts for client assets on an entity basis. This 
meant that they did not ensure that each member of the group had sufficient assets to correspond to 
the promise they made to their respective clients. They also used assets of clients without their 
consent to settle trades of other clients.
29
 The FCA noted that the irregularities happened throughout 
a period of significant market stress when the regulator would have expected regulated firms to 
have heightened regard to the requirements of client asset protection.
30
 Furthermore, Barclays Bank 
was fined in 2014 because it had not adequately restricted the rights of third party sub-custodians 
which exposed client assets to the risk of being subject to an interest arising for the benefit of sub-
custodians without the clients' agreement.
31
 These could have resulted in shortfalls. 
                                               
26
 ibid, 515-519. 
27
 Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment accompanying the document ‘Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on Central 
Securities Depositories (CSDs) and amending Directive 98/26/EC /* SWD/2012/0022’ – COD 2012/0029 para 
8.9.Annex 9 
28
  In Re Dole Food Company, Inc Stockholder Litigation Consolidated CA No 8703-VCL Memorandum Opinion of 
the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware February 15, 2017 available from 
http://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=252690. 
29
 FCA Final Notice, The Bank of New York Mellon London Branch (122467) The Bank of New York Mellon 
International Limited (183100) 15 April 2015, [2.3], [4.8] - [4.10] and [4.17] – [4.20]. 
30
 ibid, [2.10(5)], [6.11(6)] and [6.30(1)]. 
31
 FCA Final Notice, Barclays Bank PLC (122702) 23 September 2014, [4.11]. 
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IV. Explaining the infrastructure from the perspective of custodians 
To understand why this complex structure has emerged it is useful to remember that complexity 
suits custodians. Custody chains enable each of the custodians to operate a relatively simple regime. 
This reduces costs for each custodian.
32
 But these savings do not add up to the benefit of 
investors.
33
 On the contrary, the savings of the custodians are passed on to investors as a cost.   
We have seen that custody chains reduce the liability exposure of custodians. Custodians holding 
securities in house are liable for the full range of custody services provided by their staff.  
Custodians who outsource custody contract limit their liability. They only accept the risk of having 
adequately identified and monitored their respective sub-custodian. They are unlikely to accept 
responsibility for custodians operating elsewhere in the chain. For the individual custodians this is 
attractive and a benefit associated with the existing infrastructure. Investors experience the 
reduction of liability as an increase in risk. It has been mentioned elsewhere in this book that 
custody chains make it possible for investors to hold securities from different jurisdictions through 
one account.
34
 This is, for course, an operational benefit, but the convenience comes at a price and 
investors need to determine if, on balance, that benefit outweighs the potential reduction in value.  
Complexity also hinders competition. This infrastructure is held together by a web of bilateral 
contracts that custodians have set up between them. Neil Flingstein has put forward a theory that 
explains markets from a political-cultural perspective.
35
 He writes that the social structures of 
markets are best viewed as an attempt to mitigate the effects of competition between firms. The 
main goal of firms is to ensure their own long-term survival. To this end they strive to be internally 
efficient. They also act politically by creating relationships and networks with other firms and 
customers. Market participants such as custodians operate with a view to reducing their exposure to 
competition with other firms.   
It is easy to understand why custodians would benefit from operating in a complex environment that 
makes it difficult for customers to view and therefore compare the services that are provided and the 
income that is generated by the participating firms.     
V. The perspective of investors 
Why do investors (that is, those who are ultimate account holders) accept this? Intermediation and 
outsourcing are common in many industries. In the construction industry, main contractors operate 
on the basis of sub-contractors to whom they outsource elements of the project. In the 
manufacturing sector, products are assembled with parts that are sometimes sourced through long 
and complicated supply chains. In both examples, however, the main contractor/vendor of the final 
product assumes full liability for the contributions made by the members of the chain.   
In custody chains this is different. The terms referred to above have an unusual effect when 
compared to other industries. Ultimate account holders not only provide custodians with permission 
to use sub-custodians. They also agree to be affected by risk that operates at the sub-custody level. 
                                               
32
 See Christopher Twemlow’s chapter in this volume, ‘Why are securities held in intermediated form?’ at ch 4.III.C 
33
 For more detail on this see Micheler (n 5) at 508 and 531-532. 
34See Christopher Twemlow’s chapter in this volume, ‘Why are securities held in intermediated form?’ at Ch 4.III.A. . 
35
 Neil Flingstein, 'Markets as Politics – A Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions, (1996) 61(4) Amercian 
Sociological Review 656, 657. 
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This is unusual. The vendor of a product would not normally have a contractual right to reject 
liability because a defect was caused by a part supplied by a sub-contractor.   
Also alternatives exist. UK domestic securities can be held directly with the CSD. For international 
securities economies of scale may explain why some intermediation exists. In the Eckerle case, for 
example, the custody chain, again as viewed from the perspective of the ultimate account holder , 
concerned consisted of 
Mr Eckerle 
Postbank 
Clearstream Banking Luxembourg 
Bank of NY Mellon 
Crest (Euroclear) 
 
Mr Eckerle held his shares through Postbank.  It may not be economical for Postbank to have a 
direct link with Crest. Economies of scale may therefore explain why Postbank uses Clearstream. 
What scale does not explain, however, is the presence of BNY Mellon. Does Clearstream Banking 
Luxembourg really not have enough UK connected business to pay for a direct link with Crest?   
In the Secure Capital case the chain consisted of 
 
Secure Capital 
RBS Global Banking (Luxembourg) SA 
Clearstream Banking Luxembourg 
Bank of New York Mellon 
 
The bond was a bespoke re-insurance product. Secure Capital held all units. Access to a trading 
facility was presumably not important. The amount of money invested was substantial. It would 
have been possible for Secure Capital  to be issued with one paper certificate which they could have 
kept with one custodian.   
 
A. Market for lemons 
Neoclassical economics assumes rational actors. Resources are allocated through price.
36
 In this 
world asset prices reflect all risk associated with an asset. They reflect issuer risk and also custody 
risk.     
We all know that actors are not rational,
37
 but the neoclassical perspective can nevertheless provide 
us with an explanation for the current infrastructure. This infrastructure is not only complex, it is 
                                               
36
 Thorsten Veblen, ‘Preconceptions of Economic Science’ (1900) 14 (2) Quarterly Journal of Economics 240. 
37
 See, for example, Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten (eds), Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Tool Box 
(Cambridge Massachuests 2001) or Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (New York 2011). 
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also opaque. Ultimate account holder  may know that there are sub-custodians, but they do not 
know who these sub-custodians are. The do not know how many there are. They do not know the 
terms that they are affected by. They cannot evaluate the infrastructure risk that affects their 
investment.
38
  
Under such circumstances a market for lemons emerges.
39
 This is a type of market failure. Because 
they are unable to evaluate the infrastructure risk for individual assets rational investors assume a 
'worst case' risk discount. In this framework investors are aware of infrastructure risk, care about it 
and protect themselves. The mechanism through which they look after their interests is price.   
From the perspective of this framework there is no need to worry about investors. There is 
nevertheless a problem. Infrastructure risk reduces the price that rational investors pay for assets.  
That has a knock-on effect on issuers for whom the cost of borrowing increases accordingly.  
Resources are allocated inefficiently. Issuers pay too much for plumbing. They subsidise an 
inefficient infrastructure.   
The classical remedy is transparency/disclosure.
40
 To be able to adequately price infrastructure risk 
rational investors need to know who the sub-custodians are and on what terms securities are held in 
sub-custody. Once transparency is established resources are allocated efficiently and issuers no 
longer have to swallow the cost associated with the infrastructure. It will be suggested below that a 
longer term solution to the problems analysed in this chapter would be to increase disclosure 
requirements. 
 
B. Imbalances of bargaining power 
Even in an economy with rational actors market friction can occur. One example of market friction 
is an imbalance in bargaining power. Such an imbalance can be found here. 
According to a survey published by the Department for Business Innovation and Skills in relation to 
the Intermediated Shareholding Model in January 2016, there are 6 types of investors in equity 
securities (two individual and four institutional
41
): individual equity investors; individual equity 
investors with an association to an interest group such as ShareSoc or the UK Shareholders 
                                               
38
 Micheler, (n 5) at 509-511 and Eva Micheler and Luke von der Heyde, 'Holding, clearing and settling securities 
through blockchain/distributed ledger technology: creating an efficient system by empowering investors' (2016) 11 
Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 652 at 656 
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/68792/1/Micheler_Holding%2C_clearing_and.pdf>, accessed 27 June 2018. 
39
 The market for lemons argument was first made by George A Ackerlof, ‘The Market for Lemons: Quality 
Uncertainty and Market Mechanism’ (1970) 84 (3) Quarterly Journal of Economics 488. In 2001 the author, together 
with Joseph Stiglitz and Michael Spence jointly received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics Sciences for their 
research on issues related to asymmetric information.  
40
 Jennifer Payne and Louise Gullifer, Corporate Finance Law: Principles and Policy 2
nd
 edn (Hart Publishing 2015) 
489-495 and 524-528; Luca Enriques and Sergio Gilotta, ‘Disclosure and Financial Market Regulation’ in Niamh 
Moloney, Eilis Ferran and Jennifer Payne, The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (OUP, 2015) 512; John 
Armour, Dan Awrey, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Jeffrey N Gordon, Colin Mayer and Jennifer Payne, Principles of 
Financial Regulation (OUP, 2016) 160. 
41
 Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Exploring the Intermediated Shareholding Model, BIS Research 
Paper 261, available from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/shareholding-the-role-of-intermediaries, for 
individual investors see pages 27- 37; institutional investors are listed on page 86. 
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Association (UKSA); pension funds; insurance companies; open-ended and closed funds offered to 
both retail and institutional investors; and charities, sovereign wealth funds and foundations.   
The bargaining power of individual equity investors is limited. For institutional investors it is worth 
pointing out that these are not necessarily ultimate investors. For funds, including pension funds, 
the ultimate investors are pensioners and savers. These delegate the administration of their assets to 
trustees or asset managers.
42
 They authorise these service providers to appoint custodian and accept 
custody terms at which point they connect to custody chains and accept the inherent erosion of their 
rights. The bargaining power of these investors (who are, in the terminology of this book, ultimate 
account holders) is limited in the same way as the power of individual equity investors.   
To restore the efficient allocation of resources, the law can help to overcome imbalances in 
bargaining power. Rules that require custodians to ask for the signature of retail investors in order 
to be able to engage in lending arrangements are an example of such an intervention. The Client 
Asset Rules drawn up by the FCA (CASS) state that a firm must not enter into arrangements for 
securities financing transactions in respect of safe custody assets unless the client has given express 
prior consent.
43
 This also applies to assets held in omnibus accounts.
44
 For the purpose of obtaining 
consent from a retail client their signature or an equivalent alternative mechanism is required.
45
 It 
has been pointed out elsewhere that even where an ultimate account holder (including an individual 
investor) has not explicitly approved such transactions, the opacity of the chain and the terms used 
to authorise delegation make it nevertheless possible for sub-custodians to use retail securities for 
lending.
46
 The regulatory prohibition does not invalidate the securities financing transactions 
entered into by custodians and their sub-custodians. The delegation terms referred to above 
facilitate the erosion of legal requirements such as the requirement for a signature.
47
 The ultimate 
account holder 's main custodian, having authority to delegate and on the terms they think fit, only 
needs to adequately oversee the one custodian they appoint as a sub-custodian. There is no 
requirement for the ultimate account holder's custodian to oversee that any arrangements that 
operate below
48
 their immediate sub-custodian are in compliance with legal requirements.
49
  
 
C. Agency problems 
Retail investors who buy funds not only have limited bargaining power, they are also exposed to an 
agency problem. Their connection to the custody chain is established and managed by asset 
managers who, in the case of pension funds, will have been appointed by trustees. It has been 
                                               
42
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43
 FCA Handbook, CASS 6.4.1(1) R. 
44
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45
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49
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pointed out that this structure incorporates multiple agency conflicts.
50
 These affect investors as 
well as issuing companies. Pension trustees and asset managers are positioned to analyse and 
predict the effect of terms of custody contracts but they also act as agents. In addition back office is 
often only an afterthought. It is possible that both pension trustess and asset managers acting for 
investors focus their attention on the terms that set out investment decisions and that custody 
contracts do not receive a sufficient amount of scrutiny.
51
        
 
D. Tax 
It is also worth remembering that investment strategies of both individual equity investors and fund 
based pension investors are also informed by taxation. The government subsidises pension 
investments through tax breaks. When all qualifying investments instantly produce a return of 20% 
or more in tax savings, investors would be forgiven for placing less of a focus on investment return 
and fees. This would have to be tested empirically, but it is possible that government subsidies have 
the unintended effect of discouraging some investors to oversee the financial market infrastructure.   
 
E. Behavioural explanations 
It would be wrong to end the analysis here. Actors are not rational and there are several behavioural 
factors that may help to explain why the current infrastructure has emerged. In a world of bounded 
rationality investors are affected by certain biases. Some of these may operate here.  
Careful consideration and evaluation of custody terms takes time. Human actors are time poor and 
tend to prioritise short term problems and suffer from a bias of underestimating the likelihood of 
long term risks factors materialising.
52
 This also applies to those investors who, in principle, are 
able to appreciate the effect that contractual terms have on their investment.   
Perhaps retail investors accept the currently prevailing outsourcing arrangements because they 
habitually do not invest the time required to evaluate the risk associated with current market 
infrastructure? The BIS study provides some empirical evidence pointing towards the conclusion 
that the investment chain and its effect is poorly understood.
53
   
There are also limitations on the cognitive ability of human actors to anticipate problems. It is 
impossible to anticipate all future events that a contract will have to absorb.
54
 In addition the human 
mind has limited analytical power. Investors or their lawyers are unable to fully appreciate all 
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problems that will arise when terms that allow for a sub-custody arrangements are applied in those 
future events that are foreseeable. Legal analysis, like all human analysis, is limited by past 
experience. We suffer from a bias that assumes that the future will be like the past.
55
 It is possible 
that lawyers that advised investors on custody terms before Eckerle and Secure Capital may not 
have placed sufficient weight on the question of enforcement.  This may help to explain why even 
investors who are rich in time and resources would not have been aware of the effects highlighted 
by these two cases.   
 
F. Market failure 
A lot more can be and needs to be said about the causes of the current infrastructure.
56
 On the basis 
of this chapter the preliminary conclusion is that it is possible that the infrastructure is the product 
of a market failure. Behavioural considerations may explain that investors are unaware of the nature 
and scale of custody risk. We can also conclude that, even if they were aware, direct and indirect 
retail investors do not necessarily have the bargaining power to protect themselves through contract 
law.  
VI. Quick fixes – holding directly and avoiding English law. 
Investors with bargaining power such as high net worth individuals, sovereign wealth funds or 
wellendowed foundations are in a position to re-think their custody arrangements.  In Eckerle the 
investors could and should have held the securities directly. In Secure Capital there was no need for 
a custody chain either. Secure Capital could have requested the issue of a certificate evidencing its 
holding.  
More generally from the perspective of those advising investors, and from the perspective of 
trustees holding assets for beneficiaries, the effects of custody chains on the rights of investors need 
to be taken into consideration when arrangements are made for the holding of securities. Those 
looking after portfolios of substantial value have significant bargaining power. They can use this 
bargain power to insist on holding securities directly. If they reach the conclusion that indirect 
holdings give them operational benefits they can and should nevertheless limit the ability of their 
custodian to out-source custody. They should ensure that they know who the sub-custodians are that 
operate in the chain and on what terms the securities are held by them. This would enable them to 
evaluate if they receive adequate return for any lending arrangements that occur. They should also 
ensure that they have rights to claim for negligence or fraud against sub-custodians and are able to 
claim against issuers directly. International investors with bargaining power can opt out of English 
law.   
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VII. The role of technology 
It has been suggested elsewhere that technology may help to overcome the problems currently 
troubling the infrastructure for securities markets.
57
 The author of this chapter continues to believe 
that computer scientists are able to develop and deliver solutions that connect investors better with 
issuers while at the same time ensuring that investors are unaffected by the terms prevailing in sub-
custody arrangements.
58
 One example would be to colour or electronically earmark securities so as 
to associate them with individual investors or to identify them as securities that must not be subject 
to lending or charges by sub-custodians. It would seem that this can be done with standard database 
technology.   
To predict the impact of new digital technology it is worth looking back at the effect that 
technological changes have had in the past. A recent example is computerisation in the UK. In 
many areas of our lives computers have provided us with better direct connections. A little more 
than ten years ago the author of this paper used a highly intermediated postal network (not to 
mention the intermediated structure that operated to develop the film and print the pictures) to send 
photographs of her children to family members abroad. Now she posts on social media and grandma 
can and does immediately send her likes and offer comments.   
Yet for securities the arrival of direct and electronic links has coincided with intermediation. Easy 
direct connections have created a web of intermediaries. By providing better links intermediation 
has become easier and the providers of the infrastructure for financial markets have used the 
technology to organise the services that they provide. This is not a result that those setting up the 
computerised settlement system would necessarily have predicted. 
With distributed ledger or blockchain technology a new method for maintaining securities registers 
has become available. The technology has been said to make it possible for trading, clearing and 
settlement to merge into one real time process that does not involve relationships with multiple 
intermediaries. There is no need for separate trading, clearing and settlement venues. There is no 
exposure to the risk of any one central provider failing. Buyer and seller can interact directly with 
each other. They can exchange securities and cash directly and in real time. The cost of securities 
settlement could be reduced as a result.
59
 
In terms of user interface not much needs to change. Investors would access their portfolio as they 
do now, electronically or through paper statements. But while at present they receive an interest in 
an asset kept by an intermediary who is connected to another intermediary who is connected to yet 
another intermediary, what they could see in a distributed ledger/blockchain environment would be 
the master record. The same could become true on the money side. At present investors view a 
balance of an account held by a bank. In the future their view could be of a master record of money 
held at the central bank. The Bank of England has concluded that it will not use distributed ledger 
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technology for its payment system. It is, however, ensuring that its new upgraded payment system 
is compatible with the requirements of distributed ledger technology.
60
      
It has been suggested elsewhere that the providers of the incumbent market infrastructure will 
struggle to fund such a development.
61
 They are limited by the boundaries of their current business 
model.
62
   
Moreover it is worth observing that a blockchained distributed ledger can also be operated on an 
intermediated basis. Bitcoin are an example.
63
 The main Bitcoin blockchain has yet to be hacked.  
Nevertheless the bitcoins have been lost and stolen. The vulnerable point are the private keys.  
These are necessary for users to send bitcoins to other users. Like passwords these need to be kept 
safe and can become the subject of a hack.   
In addition not all bitcoin holders download the main bitcoin blockchain to their computer. For 
users that are not interested in becoming nodes, wallet providers have emerged. These providers 
connect individuals to the main software. There are two options: hosted and non-hosted wallets. The 
holder of a non-hosted wallet stores her private key: on a computer that is connected to the internet 
(hot storage and perhaps not the safest option); on a computer that is not connected to the internet 
(safer but a backup is recommended); or perhaps even on a piece of paper that she keeps in a vault 
or under her mattress (cold storage and the safest option?). A hosted wallet is an intermediated 
option where the client does not have access to their private key. At a functional level hosted 
wallets operate in a way that is similar to intermediated securities. A wallet provider promises to 
hold private keys for users.  It is then, of course, possible for wallet providers to make too many 
promises to customers and not to have enough private keys. This is what happened in the 
insolvency of Mt Gox where wallet holders discovered a shortfall of bitcoin (or better private 
keys).
64
 The author knows of no evidence of wallet chains in the bitcoin environment.   
Against this background it is possible to predict that a blockchained distributed ledger environment 
will not necessarily lead to less intermediation.
65
   
VIII. Pointers towards long-term solutions 
A situation where investors are exposed to infrastructure risk that they are unaware of is 
unappealing.  The current arrangements prevent the ultimate bearers of the risk inherent in the 
infrastructure from effectively overseeing this infrastructure. This creates moral hazard for the 
service providers. It has led to a situation where service levels are so poor that shortfalls of 30% 
come to light in the restructuring of blue chip companies listed in the United States.   
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The complexity of the infrastructure also prevents competition. Governments need to consider if 
and how to intervene. This is particularly true in circumstances where the government subsidises 
investments in financial markets.   
The solution to the problems analysed in this paper is remarkably simple. To avoid the diluting 
effect of custody chains investors can reject certain delegation clauses and opt to hold assets 
directly. This can be done for the domestic UK equity market without a change of the current 
framework.
66
 Custodians sometimes point out that direct holdings are more costly. This argument 
had significant force when securities were held through negotiable paper certificates. Individual 
holdings required a manual sorting process. It has less force in an electronic environment. Is it 
possible that a chain of accounts maintained by several service providers, who all have a cost base 
and all need to comply with regulation and pay their shareholders, can be provided at a lower cost 
than one electronic account maintained by one provider?   
The government can intervene through legislation. There are a number of options available which 
will be set out below.  
 
A. Section 28 of the Companies Act 2006 
The problem that arose in Eckerle can be resolved by amending section 98 of the Companies Act 
2006. At present a shareholder cannot claim under that section if he voted in favour of the 
resolution authorising a transformation of a public company into a private company. This means 
that the section is unavailably in cases of indirect holdings. In Eckerle Bank of New York Mellon 
was the shareholder whose name was registered with the company. It voted for indirect investors 
who were in favour of the transformation as well as for those who opposed it. Even if they had 
wanted to they would have been unable to claim on behalf of Mr Eckerle under that section. The 
Jenkins Committee pointed out this problem and recommended reform which has, however, not yet 
been implemented.
67
 It would be possible to remedy this particular problem by allowing registered 
shareholders who hold shares on behalf of indirect investors and voted in favour of as well as 
against the resolution to claim under section 98 of the Companies Act 2006.  
 
B. Disclosure of custody arrangements 
Disclosure of the identity of the sub-custodians and on what terms they operate will help investors 
who are rich in time and resources and who have the bargaining power to operate a strategy that is 
rational if only in a bounded way. It will put the ball in the court of pension trustees and asset 
managers who, in light of the decisions in Eckerle and in Secure Capital, are well advised to take a 
closer look at the custody contracts they accept on behalf of investors. In particular they need to 
decide if the benefits of operational convenience delivers sufficient cost savings from the 
perspective of the beneficiaries they look after to outweigh the risks posed by custody chains on 
asset values. 
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C. Regulating outsourcing 
Disclosure does not assist investors who are time and resource poor, nor those with limited 
bargaining power. Rules that limit the contractual freedom of custodians help from their 
perspective.   
At present the law does not limit the ability of custodians to seek authority for out-sourcing.
68
 
CASS 6.2.3(2)d R  explicitly permits the outsourcing of custody. The CASS rules instruct 
custodians not to use certain terms in sub-custody arrangements. They also stipulate a list of topics 
that should be covered in the contract with a third party without prescribing the content of the 
arrangement.
69
  But this does not prohibit custodians from agreeing with their customers that they 
determine the content of sub-custody terms. There also exists a general clause expressing the level 
of skill and care that is to be applied by a custodian when contracting with a sub-custodian. A 
custodian must exercise 'all due skill, care and diligence in the selection…and periodic review…of 
the arrangements for the holding and safekeeping' of client assets’.70 This also does not prohibit 
custodians from receiving from their clients permission for setting such terms and it does not 
prevent investors from being affected by those terms. 
This has created a situation where any provision that is contained in the investor's custody contract, 
- including those that are required by law to have a signature - can be eroded by delegation. The 
regulator can limit the ability of custodians to outsource custody by specifying a service level that 
custodians need to deliver. One such example would be a requirement to ensure that outsourcing 
occurs on terms that enable investors to exercise any rights they have against their immediate 
custodian also against any sub-custodian. Another example would be a requirement to ensure that 
investors can exercise rights against issuers.   
 
D. Mandatory liability rules 
It would be possible to tighten the liability regime for custodians who act either for retail investors 
directly or for funds that serve the retail sector. The suppliers of goods who also benefit from 
outsourcing bear the full risk of problems arising in their supply chain. Custodians should do the 
same. They should be responsible for the full risk arising from any of their sub-custodians.  
Custodians sometimes mention that they are unable to carry this risk. Their point is that the market 
works in a certain way and so their hands are tied. This appears to be an argument designed to 
protect the benefits the current model has for custodians. Custodians outsource through contract 
law. The market is fairly concentrated.
71
 The participants are large financial institutions with 
bargaining power. They do and can control who to outsource to. They are also able to negotiate 
terms on which such outsourcing occurs. It is within their gift to ensure that the infrastructure 
provides a reliable connection between investors and issuers. At present their incentives steer them 
towards creating an opaque and complex infrastructure and passing the risk of that on to investors. 
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These incentives should be reversed. The law should put them in a position where they benefit from 
enabling investors to exercise their rights against issuers. 
The strategy of shifting the risk of outsourcing to custodians has been applied in relation to 
Alternative Investment Funds. The AIFM Regulations 2013 provide that a depositary shall be liable 
for the loss by the depositary or a ‘third party’ to whom the custody of financial instruments has 
been delegated.
72
 If the instruments have been lost, the depositary shall return a financial instrument 
of identical type or corresponding amount to the Alternative Investment Fund without undue delay. 
The liability is independent of the depositary's negligence. It can only be avoided if the depositary 
can prove that the loss has arisen as a result of an external event beyond its reasonable control, the 
consequences of which would have been unavoidable despite all reasonable efforts to the contrary.  
The liability of the depositary, however, only arises when the financial instruments are lost and the 
term ‘loss’ is defined narrowly.73 For the liability to arise the loss has to be ‘certain’ or ‘definite’. In 
the event of the insolvency of a custodian, for example, the loss will have occurred at the latest at 
the end of the insolvency proceedings.
74
 Time is an important factor in this area of the law. 
Insolvency proceedings for financial services providers can span many years during which there 
may not be certainty as to whether securities have been lost to investors.
75
  
Moreover, the remedy provides for securities of the same type to be returned. It is possible that, by 
the time certain conclusions can be drawn as to whether they have been lost, they no longer have 
value to the Alternative Investment Fund. These rules should be tightened. Custodians should be 
liable for the full risk arising out of their respective supply chains. 
 
E. Syncronising reconciliations 
Custodians need to carry out internal reconciliations of the safe custody assets held for each client 
with the safe custody assets held by the custodian and its sub-custodian.
76
 Reconciliations are 
designed to reduce mistakes and protect client assets in the insolvency of a firm. A custodian must 
also conduct external reconciliations between its internal accounts and those of any third party by 
whom those safe custody assets are held.
77
 CASS auditors test reconciliations and obtain external 
confirmations.
78
   
Each custodian needs to reconcile its records with his immediate sub-custodian's records. All 
custodians need to reconcile, but this does not fully protect investors. Custodians other than the 
investor's immediate service providers only have information about their two immediate contractual 
partners. They cannot verify if there are sufficient securities to satisfy the interest of the investor.   
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Moreover, reconciliations are carried out at each level at a different time. No one checks if, at a 
given point in time, the numbers add up at all levels starting from the investor and following 
through the records of all custodians operating between him and the issuer. This can mask 
irregularities which can remain unnoticed for a significant period of time. In the final notice served 
on Barclays Bank PLC, the FCA dealt with a situation where a regulated firm had not noticed 
irregularities in third party arrangements that persisted for over three years.
79
 In the case of Bank of 
New York Mellon, inadequate record keeping and reconciliations remained unnoticed for a period 
of five years and nine months.
80
 In both cases investors who used the two custodians, as well as 
those investors who used a different custodian but where Barclays or BNYM acted as sub-
custodians at some other level in the chain, would have been affected by the shortfalls.   
Regulators could intervene to require reconciliations to span the chain, requiring custodians and 
their auditors to verify the availability of securities along the chain rather than on a bilateral basis. 
They could also require computer systems in custody chains to operate on the basis of an 
earmarking facility. Earmarking of client assets along the custody chain should certainly be part of 
any new technological solution.   
 
F. Addressing regulatory capture 
One important point needs to be made from the perspective of policy making. Policy makers tend to 
consult with market participants through an open tender process. They invite all to contribute. This 
works well for the custody industry. They are well funded and organised. They can research and 
articulate their points with a high degree of sophistication. This makes it possible for service 
providers to be over-represented in policy making processes. The phenomenon of intermediary 
influence has been observed across a number of areas of the financial services industry.
81
 One 
example is worth mentioning here. The Legal Certainty Group, which assisted the European 
Commission in developing legislation for intermediated securities, had a significant number of 
representatives from custodians and law firms advising the custody industry. They also had 
independent experts including academics. It did not have any member, however, that was associated 
with a shareholder association or an association of pension fund trustees.
82
 It would seem that 
regulators need to adopt a more proactive approach to consultation and reach out beyond the 
custody industry, the legal profession and academia to facilitate contributions from individuals who 
are closer to the retail perspective.   
 
G. Custody accounts as bank deposits 
It may be worth rethinking this area at a more fundamental level. Perhaps we need to give up on the 
idea that custody chains supply property rights?  Maybe computerisation has made delegation so 
easy and the ability of custodians to generate income by organising the lending of securities has 
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made it so attractive that interests in securities no longer exist? Perhaps custodians, by participating 
in lending markets, are becoming increasingly similar to banks? This would require a fuller analysis 
than is possible in the context of this chapter, but it is possible that we have reached a point in time 
where client asset rules no longer suffice to ensure financial stability in the sector and the custody 
business needs to be subject to the same requirements as the taking of deposits.  
IX. Conclusions 
 
This chapter has developed explanations for the distinctive characteristics of the infrastructure 
underpinning securities markets. It has advanced the thesis that this infrastructure is the product of 
market failure. This market failure has resulted in investors/issuers paying too high a price for the 
services underpinning securities markets. The government is subsidising this by providing retail 
investors with tax breaks that make it attractive for them to invest pension savings in securities 
markets rather than save for retirement in other ways.  
The chapter concludes that distributed ledger technology is unlikely to fix the problem. A quick fix 
solution consists in holding securities directly and in avoiding English law. There are also longer 
term solutions available for government intervention. These are: reforming section 98 of the 
Companies Act 2006, allowing registered shareholders to claim for indirect investors; a requirement 
for disclosure of the identity and the terms operated by sub-custodians; limitations on the ability of 
custodians to outsource custody; a requirement to synchronise the reconciliation of holdings along 
the chain; a requirement for computer systems to earmark client securities; and a more pro-active 
approach in relation to consultation exercises. Finally the author tentatively observes that we may 
have reached a point where property rights in securities no longer exist, where client asset rules are 
no longer sufficient to ensure financial stability and where the custody business should be treated in 
the same way as the banking business.  
